The Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) protocol defines a standard framework and mechanism for the interconnection between control elements and forwarding elements in IP routers and similar devices. In this document we describe the applicability of the ForCES model and protocol. We provide example deployment scenarios and functionality, as well as document applications that would be inappropriate for ForCES.
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English. The Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) protocol defines a standard framework and mechanism for the exchange of information between the logically separate functionality of the control and data forwarding planes of IP routers and similar devices. It focuses on the communication necessary for separation of control plane functionality such as routing protocols, signaling protocols, and admission control from data forwarding plane per-packet activities such as packet forwarding, queuing, and header editing.
This document defines the applicability of the ForCES mechanisms. It describes types of configurations and settings where ForCES is most appropriately applied. This document also describes scenarios and configurations where ForCES would not be appropriate for use.
Purpose
The purpose of the ForCES Applicability Statement is to capture the intent of the ForCES protocol [RFC5810] designers as to how the protocol could be used in conjunction with the ForCES model [RFC5812] and a Transport Mapping Layer [RFC5811] .
Terminology
A set of concepts associated with ForCES was introduced in "Requirements for Separation of IP Control and Forwarding" [RFC3654] and in "Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) Framework" [RFC3746] . The terminology associated with these concepts and with the protocol elements in ForCES is defined in the "Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) Protocol Specification" [RFC5810] .
The reader is directed to these documents for the conceptual introduction and for definitions, including the following acronyms: During the association phase, CEs and FEs exchange capability information with each other. For example, the FEs express the number of interface ports they provide, as well as the static and configurable attributes of each port.
In addition to initial configuration, the CEs and FEs also exchange dynamic configuration changes using ForCES. For example, FEs asynchronously inform the CEs of an increase/decrease in available resources or capabilities on the FE.
Topology Information Exchange
In this context, topology information relates to how the FEs are interconnected with each other with respect to packet forwarding. Topology discovery is outside the scope of the ForCES protocol. An implementation can choose its own method of topology discovery (for example, it can use a standard topology discovery protocol or apply a static topology configuration policy). Once the topology is established, the ForCES protocol may be used to transmit the resulting information to the CEs.
Configuration
ForCES is used to perform FE configuration. For example, CEs set configurable FE attributes such as IP addresses, etc. for their interfaces.
Routing Exchange
ForCES may be used to deliver packet forwarding information resulting from CE routing calculations. For example, CEs may send forwarding 
Encapsulation/Tunneling Exchange
ForCES may be used to exchange encapsulation capabilities of an FE, such as tunneling, and the configuration of such capabilities.
NAT and Application-Level Gateways
ForCES may be used to exchange configuration information for Network Address Translators. Whilst ForCES is not specifically designed for the configuration of application-level gateway functionality, this may be in scope for some types of application-level gateways.
Measurement and Accounting
ForCES may be used to exchange configuration information regarding traffic measurement and accounting functionality. In this area, ForCES may overlap somewhat with functionality provided by network management mechanisms such as the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). In some cases, ForCES may be used to convey information to the CE to be reported externally using SNMP. A further discussion of this capability is covered in Section 6 of this document. Given the above, it is possible to deploy redundant CEs and FEs that incorporate failover.
CE-FE Link Capability
When using ForCES, the bandwidth of the CE-FE link is a consideration, and cannot be ignored. For example, sending a full routing table is reasonable over a high-bandwidth link, but could be non-trivial over a lower-bandwidth link. ForCES should be sufficiently future-proof to be applicable in scenarios where routing tables grow to several orders of magnitude greater than their current size. However, we also note that not all IP routers need full routing tables.
CE/FE Locality
ForCES is intended for environments where one of the following applies:
o The control interconnect is some form of local bus, switch, or LAN, where reliability is high, closely controlled, and not susceptible to external disruption that does not also affect the CEs and/or FEs.
o The control interconnect shares its fate with the FE's forwarding function. Typically this is because the control connection is also the FE's primary packet forwarding connection, and so if that link goes down, the FE cannot forward packets anyway.
The key guideline is that the reliability of the device should not be significantly reduced by the separation of control and forwarding functionality.
Taking this into account, ForCES is applicable in the following CE/FE localities:
Single Box NE: chassis with multiple CEs and FEs set up. ForCES is applicable in localities consisting of control and forwarding elements that are components in the same physical box.
Example: a network element with a single control blade, and one or more forwarding blades, all present in the same chassis and sharing an interconnect such as Ethernet or Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI). In this locality, the majority of the data traffic being forwarded typically does not traverse the same links as the ForCES control traffic.
Multiple Box NE: separated CE and FE, where physical locality could be the same rack, room, or building; or long distances that could span across continents and oceans. ForCES is applicable in localities consisting of control and forwarding elements that are separated by a single hop or multiple hops in the network.
Security Considerations
The ForCES protocol allows for a variety of security levels [RFC5810] . When operating under a secured physical environment, or for other operational concerns (in some cases, performance issues), the operator may turn off all the security functions between CEs and FEs. When the operator makes a decision to secure the path between the FEs and CEs, then the operator chooses from one of the options provided by the TML. Security choices provided by the TML take effect during the pre-association phase of the ForCES protocol. An operator may choose to use all, some, or none of the security services provided by the TML in a CE-FE connection. A ForCES NE is required to provide CE/FE node authentication services, and may provide message integrity and confidentiality services. The NE may provide these services by employing IPsec or Transport Layer Security (TLS), depending on the choice of TML used in the deployment of the NE.
ForCES Manageability
From the architectural perspective, the ForCES NE is a single network element. As an example, if the ForCES NE is specifically a router that needs to be managed, then it should be managed in essentially the same way any router should be managed. From another perspective, element management could directly view the individual entities and interfaces that make up a ForCES NE. However, any element management updates made directly on these entities and interfaces may compromise the control relationship between the CEs and the FEs, unless the update mechanism has been accounted for in the model used by the NE.
The NE as an Atomic Element
From the ForCES Requirements [RFC3654] , Section 4, point 4:
A NE MUST support the appearance of a single functional device.
As a single functional device, a ForCES NE runs protocols, and each of the protocols has its own existing manageability aspects that are documented elsewhere. As an example, a router would also have a configuration interface. When viewed in this manner, the NE is controlled as a single routing entity, and no new management beyond what is already available for routers and routing protocols would be required for a ForCES NE. Management commands on a management interface to the NE will arrive at the CE and may require ForCES interactions between the CE and FEs to complete. This may impact the atomicity of such commands and may require careful implementation by the CE.
The NE as Composed of Manageable Elements
When viewed as a decomposed set of elements from the management perspective, the ForCES NE is divided into a set of one of more control elements, forwarding elements, and the interfaces between them. The interface functionality between the CE and the FE is provided by the ForCES protocol. A MIB module is provided for the purpose of gaining management information on the operation of the protocol described in Section 6.3 of this document.
Additionally, the architecture makes provisions for configuration control of the individual CEs and FEs. This is handled by elements called the FE Manager (FEM) and the CE Manager (CEM). Specifically, from the ForCES Requirements RFC [RFC3654] , Section 4, point 4:
However, external entities (e.g., FE Managers and CE Managers) MAY have direct access to individual ForCES protocol elements for providing information to transition them from the pre-association to the post-association phase. CE Manager (CEM): A logical entity responsible for generic CE management tasks. It is particularly used during the pre-association phase to determine with which FE(s) a CE should communicate.
FE Manager (FEM):
A logical entity responsible for generic FE management tasks. It is used during the pre-association phase to determine with which CE(s) an FE should communicate.
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